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Fair Value Accounting and Procyclicality: Accounting for Securitization 
 
Abstract 
The recent financial crisis has lead to heated debates on the pros and cons of fair value 
accounting from the perspectives of illiquidity and procyclicality. Previous research 
investigates the relationship between fair value accounting and procyclicality and finds 
mixed evidence of this relationship during economic recessions. 
However, few studies examined the relationship between fair value accounting and 
the financial crisis during economic booms. The purpose of this study is to examine 
whether fair value accounting promotes procyclicality by focusing on securitization 
transactions during economic booms. 
We examine the relationship between securitization accounting and procyclicality by 
using a parsimonious model. The findings are as follows. When a gain on sale is 
recognized under certain conditions, sale accounting decreases the leverage ratio 
compared with that before the securitization transaction. Banks increase assets to 
maintain the target leverage ratio. Furthermore, if banks conduct securitization 
transactions and adopt sale accounting, the leverage ratio decreases; therefore, banks 
increase assets to maintain the leverage ratio. It is expected that both sale accounting 
and fair value accounting promote procyclicality during economic booms. 
This study makes two contributions to accounting literature and accounting 
standard settings. First, it proposes a new perspective on the relationship between fair 
value accounting and procyclicality. Second, this study suggests that accounting standard 
setters reconsider the movement of accounting for securitization. 
 




Currently, the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) consider fair value as a possible measurement basis 
in many situations and have moved ahead with the convergence of accounting standards 
(Barth, 2007). For instance, take accounting for financial instruments. The IASB and the 
FASB have set long-term objectives, one of which is to require all financial instruments to 
be measured at fair value, and to recognize realized and unrealized gains and losses as 
income in the period in which they occur (IASB, 2005). They have also discussed the 
adoption of full fair value accounting (IASB, 2008). 
In the U.S., when interest rates increased and residential prices dropped, subprime 
loan defaults increased. Subprime mortgage banks stopped originating subprime 
mortgages and filed for bankruptcy1. In July 2007, credit rating agencies downgraded the 
credit rates of subprime mortgage-backed securities (MBSs). The European and U.S. 
financial institutions with significant asset-backed securities, such as subprime MBSs 
and related collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), announced huge losses. Thus, credit 
crunch began and continued during 2007–2008 (Ryan, 2008b). 
The financial crisis arising from the securitization of subprime loans influenced the 
trends in full fair value accounting for financial instruments that has been promoted by 
the IASB and the FASB. For example, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) recommends 
that the standard setters consider enhancing the accounting model so that the use of fair 
value accounting is carefully examined for financial instruments of credit intermediaries 
(FSF, 2009). Moreover, the Financial Crisis Advisory Board (FCAG) states that simplified 
mixed attribute accounting rather than full fair value accounting is preferable (FCAG, 
2009, p. 5). 
The recent financial crisis has lead to heated debates on the pros and cons of fair 
                                            
1 For example, New Century Financial, the second largest subprime mortgage originator 
in 2006, stopped originating subprime mortgages and filed for bankruptcy on April 2, 
2007. 
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value accounting (Laux and Leuz, 2009; Magnan, 2009). There are two opposing views 
on the relationship between fair value accounting and the financial crisis. One is that fair 
value accounting played a substantial role in the financial crisis. It is criticized as having 
triggered a liquidity death spiral and is blamed for the crisis (American Bankers 
Association, 2008; Wallison, 2008). The other is that fair value accounting did not play a 
substantial role in the financial crisis (Barth and Landsman 2010; Laux and Leuz, 2010; 
Ryan, 2008a; SEC, 2008). Rather, fair value (market price) is only linked to capital 
regulations and private contracts (e.g., collateral and margin requirements, haircuts), 
and therefore, fair value accounting does not cause the financial crisis (Ball, 2008; Véron, 
2008). 
Recently, studies on the relationship between fair value accounting and procyclicality 
have been conducted. Analytical research demonstrates that pure fair value accounting 
contributes to procyclicality in illiquid markets as compared with pure historical cost 
accounting (Allen and Garletti, 2008; Cifuentes et al., 2005; Heaton et al., 2010; Plantin 
et al., 2008a). However, current accounting standards measure some assets at historical 
cost and other assets at fair value. Even though analytical models show that pure fair 
value accounting contributes to procyclicality, it is not clear whether there exists a 
relationship between fair value accounting and procyclicality. Focusing on the 
impairment of asset-backed securities during economic recessions, empirical studies 
investigated the relationship between fair value accounting and procyclicality and found 
mixed evidence of this relationship (e.g., Badertscher et al., 2010; Bhat et al., 2010; 
Shaffer, 2010). 
Few studies examined the relationship between fair value accounting and the 
financial crisis during economic booms2. Currently, banks do not hold loans until 
maturity and adopt an originate-and-distribute model that transfers loans for 
securitization. Banks use two accounting treatments for securitization transactions; the 
                                            
2 Bryan et al. (2010) is an exception, and they investigated whether fair value accounting 
promoted procyclicality before the financial crisis. 
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sale accounting approach and the secured borrowing accounting approach. Almost all 
banks use sale accounting for securitization transactions and report gains on sales. Fair 
value measurements of retained interests and recourse obligations affect the amount of 
the gain on sale. In some cases, a gain on sale is offset by losses after securitization. 
Gains on sale as well as unrealized income under fair value accounting have large 
uncertainties. Thus, we can analyze the relationship between fair value accounting and 
procyclicality by focusing on accounting for securitization. This study investigates and 
demonstrates this relationship during economic booms. 
This study makes two contributions to accounting literature and accounting 
standard settings. First, it proposes a new perspective on the relationship between fair 
value accounting and procyclicality. As described above, previous literature focused on 
the impairment of asset-backed securities during economic recessions and examined the 
relationship between fair value accounting and procyclicality. On the other hand, this 
study focuses on economic booms in which the cause of financial crisis was present. We 
investigate and show the relationship between fair value accounting and procyclicality 
from the perspective of accounting for securitization. 
Second, this study suggests that accounting standard setters reconsider the 
movement of accounting for securitization. The U.S. accounting standards adopted the 
financial component approach for transfer of financial assets (SFAS140; SFAS166). This 
approach assumes that financial assets are decomposed into components and that the 
measurement of each component is reliable. However, in securitization transactions, 
where the underlying assets are subprime mortgages, this assumption is not always 
satisfied. In this case, fair value measurement creates the potential for either an 
unintentional or an intentional bias. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the concept of 
procyclicality and considers the relationship between fair value accounting and 
procyclicality. Section 3 reviews previous studies that examine this relationship by 
focusing on the impairment of asset-backed securities during economic recessions. 
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Section 4 investigates whether fair value accounting promotes procyclicality from the 
perspective of accounting for securitization during economic booms. Section 5 provides 
summaries and concluding remarks. 
 
2. Procyclicality 
The relationship between fair value accounting and procyclicality has been discussed for 
a long time. Full fair value accounting for financial instruments has been proposed for 
more than ten years (FASB, 1999; IASC/CICA, 1997; JWGSS, 1999; JWGSS, 2000), but 
has faced opposition. In particular, the banking regulatory and supervisory bodies 
(central bank) have strongly opposed this proposal from the point of view of financial 
stability (procyclicality) (BIS, 2001; ECB, 2001; ECB, 2004; ECB, 2006; Enria et al., 
2004). This section reviews the concept of procyclicality and considers the relationship 
between fair value accounting and procyclicality. 
 
2.1 Concept of Procyclicality 
The development of financial systems has reinforced the momentum of underlying 
business cycles, and in some cases has led to extreme swings in business activities (Borio 
et al., 2001, p. 1). These experiences show that the dynamic interactions (positive 
feedback mechanisms) between the financial and the real sectors of the economy amplify 
business fluctuations and possibly cause or exacerbate financial instability. Such 
feedback mechanisms appear during economic downturns or when the financial system 
is strained (BIS, 2008, p. 1; FSF, 2009, p. 8). 
When banks report losses and decrease in capital, they must restrict further lending 
and/or sell assets that they hold to control capital ratios (leverage ratios); such 
retrenchment weakens economic activities. In addition, because banks are extremely 
careful in assessing the risk of default when determining their interest in firms after a 
major financial crisis and the related bankruptcies of firms, credit risk becomes 
overvalued during economic recessions. Thus, financial systems act as shock amplifiers 
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rather than playing their usual shock absorber role. 
Severe financial sector distress is preceded by unusually strong credit and growth in 
asset prices, as well as prolonged periods of unusually low risk premiums. During 
economic booms, firms usually report good performance and therefore, their credit risk 
would decrease and borrowing capabilities from banks would grow. During such times, it 
is possible for firms to increase production capacity through debt financing. In addition, 
during economic booms, banks’ risk appetite increases and external financing constraints 
are eased, which facilitates risk taking. Consequently, banks are likely to overestimate 
the creditworthiness of borrowers, and these optimistic risk assessments prompt further 
growth in credit. 
Therefore, as banks’ lending activities are by nature procyclical, the procyclicality of 
banks’ credit is already observed under historical cost accounting (Boyer, 2007, p. 791). 
However, compared with historical cost accounting, fair value accounting is expected to 
increase procyclicality by making valuations more sensitive to economic cycles (BIS, 2008, 
p. 3). In the following subsection, we consider and discuss the relationship between fair 
value accounting and procyclicality to determine the reason why fair value accounting 
promotes procyclicality compared with historical cost accounting. 
 
2.2 Fair Value Accounting and Procyclicality 
We examine the relationship between fair value accounting and procyclicality by using a 
parsimonious model. 
Denote the value of assets by  and the value of debt by , then  is the 
value of equities ( ). If an investment succeeds, banks can improve their return 
on equity (ROE) by holding more assets than equities. On the other hand, if an 
investment fails, the profitability of banks decreases. Thus, we can treat leverage ratios 
as risk measures for evaluating banks’ operating and financial risk. This study simply 
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If  increases and  is held constant,  will decrease. Therefore, leverage is 
inversely related to the value of assets. Adrian and Shin (2010) show that for U.S. 
commercial banks, the relationship between changes in assets and changes in leverage 
ratio tends to be fixed, and there is a strong positive relationship between changes in 
assets and changes in leverage ratio for U.S. investment banks. This implies that U.S. 
commercial banks and investment banks raise finances using debt and purchase assets 
to manage their leverage ratios for changes in assets. 
A D L
Then, we investigate whether fair value measurement of assets have an effect on 
procyclicality compared with historical cost measurement. In the case of historical cost 
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where  is the leverage ratio,  is value of assets and  is value of debt. First, 
we consider that banks measure assets at fair value during economic booms. Suppose 
that the price of the assets increases by 
HL HA HD
HAα  ( 0>α ) and the value of the assets ( ) is 1FA
( ) HAα+1 . In the case of fair value measurement during economic booms, the leverage 



















where  is the leverage ratio. When comparing  with ,  is smaller than 
 through the following relationship: 



















Thus, if banks maintain a constant (or increasing) leverage ratio for a given change 
in assets, they must finance using debt if they are to maintain the target leverage ratio. 
Suppose that banks maintain the same leverage ratio that is measured using historical 
costs. Banks must then take additional debt of B  to purchase assets valued at B . 
Denote the adjusted leverage ratio by  and we obtain this equality: * 1FL
( )


















DAB αα =−= . 
Banks will take additional debt to maintain the same leverage ratio that was measured 
using historical costs. If banks have higher leverage ratios, they must increase their 
amounts of debt and assets, because B is positively correlated with . When executive 
compensation is linked to ROE, bank executives have incentives to increase the leverage 
ratio during economic booms because the relationship between changes in ROE and 
changes in the leverage ratio tends to be positive during such periods. In this manner, if 
banks measure assets at fair value, banks will increase both assets and debt to maintain 
their target leverage ratio. 
HL
Next, we examine whether banks measure assets at fair value during economic 
recessions. Suppose that asset prices decreases by HAβ−  ( 10 << β ) and the value of 
assets ( ) is (2FA ) HAβ−1 . In the case of fair value measurement during economic 



















where  is the leverage ratio. When comparing  with ,  is larger than 2FL 2FL HL 2FL
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Thus, if banks maintain a constant (or decreasing) leverage ratio for given changes 
in asset value, banks must raise equity or decrease both assets and debt to maintain this 
leverage ratio. If banks find it difficult to take the former option, they must choose the 
latter option. Suppose that banks sell  worth of assets and pay off  worth of debt to 







DAC ββ =−= . 
If banks have higher leverage ratios, they must decrease the amounts of assets and debt, 
because is positively correlated with . To restrict the leverage ratio or VaR 
(Value-at-Risk), bank executives have the incentive to sell assets and decrease debt (Shin, 
2010). In this manner, if banks measure assets at fair value, banks will decrease both 
assets and debt to maintain their leverage ratio. 
C HL
Accordingly, when we assume that banks maintain a constant (or positively related) 
leverage ratio as asset prices change, fair value accounting implies that asset and debt 
values increase or decrease compared with historical cost accounting: fair value 
accounting promotes procyclicality through the “accounting accelerator effect” (Boyer, 
2007, p. 780). If financial markets are not perfectly liquid so that greater demand for 
assets increases their prices, fair value measurements decrease the leverage ratio. Banks 
increase their assets to maintain their leverage ratio. Therefore, as greater demand for 
assets puts pressure on their prices, assets are increased to maintain the target leverage 
ratio under fair value measurements. On the other hand, during an economic recession, 
we observe inverse relationships (Plantin et al., 2008b). 
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 3. Impairment and Procyclicality: Literature Review 
Suppose we assume that banks manage the leverage ratio. Then the fair value 
measurement of assets contributes to procyclicality compared with historical cost 
measurements. In particular, if financial markets are not perfectly liquid to ensure that a 
greater supply of assets reduces their prices, banks will sell assets to maintain or 
decrease the leverage ratio; this reduces asset prices, and thus banks decrease their asset 
holdings (Allen and Garletti, 2008; Cifuentes et al., 2005; Heaton et al., 2010). Banks can 
also sell relatively illiquid assets to preempt the anticipated sales made by other market 
participants when bank executives focus on short-term earnings for executive 
compensation (Plantin et al., 2008a). 
Analytical research demonstrates that pure fair value accounting contributes to 
procyclicality in illiquid markets as compared with pure historical cost accounting. 
However, existing accounting standards measure some assets at historical cost and other 
assets at fair value. Neither pure historical cost accounting nor pure fair value 
accounting has been adopted. In fact, for the U.S. banks, loans and leases held for 
investment that apply historical cost accounting comprise half or more of their total 
assets (Laux and Leuz, 2010; SEC, 2008). Even though theoretical models show that 
pure fair value accounting promotes procyclicality, it is not clear that the relationship 
between fair value accounting and procyclicality is actually observed. 
When the fair value of asset-backed securities was below its cost basis and this 
decline was judged to be other-than-temporary impairment, the carrying amounts of 
these securities were written down to fair value and impairment losses were recognized 
in earnings3. With regard to procyclicality, impairment of asset-backed securities is 
                                            
3 The FASB amends accounting for impairment of financial assets to mitigate the effects 
of financial crisis. In April 2009, the FASB issued FASB Staff Position, No. FAS115-2 and 
FAS 124-2, Recognition and Presentation of Other-Than-Temporary Impairments, and 
required that other-than-temporary impairment is separated into credit loss and other 
factors and be recognized in earnings for the former and in other comprehensive income 
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expected to have the same effect as fair value accounting. Thus, prior empirical research 
examines the relationship between fair value accounting and procyclicality by focusing 
on impairment. 
Shaffer (2010) analyzes the relationship between fair value accounting and 
procyclicality using a sample of 14 large bank holding companies in 2008. The analysis 
verifies that other-than-temporary impairments of available-for-sale and 
held-to-maturity securities have quite small effects on regulatory capital (Tier 1), and the 
evidence of procyclical behavior, such as the fire-sale of assets, was not found. Shaffer 
(2010) shows that for many banks, loan loss provisions have larger effects on regulatory 
capital than other-than-temporary impairments4. 
Badertscher et al. (2010) investigated whether fair value accounting promotes 
procyclicality by using a sample of 150 bank holding companies. The industry-level 
analyses found that although other-than-temporary impairments of available-for-sale 
and held-to-maturity securities increased during the financial crisis (2007–2008), 
other-than-temporary impairments had minimal impact on regulatory capital (Tier 1) 
compared with loan loss provisions. Sales of available-for-sale and held-to-maturity 
securities during the financial crisis were in line with levels seen before the crisis 
(2004–2006): Badertscher et al. (2010) found no evidence of banks’ fire-sale of assets 
during the crisis. On the other hand, firm-level analyses showed that sales of securities 
were significantly correlated with the amount of other-than-temporary impairments and 
with decrease in capital ratios. This result suggests a relationship between fair value 
accounting and procyclicality. However, as other analyses found no evidence of procyclical 
behavior such as fire-sale of assets, Badertscher et al. (2010) concluded that fair value 
accounting does not contribute to procyclicality. 
While Shaffer (2010) and Badertscher et al. (2010) focused on the relationship 
                                                                                                                                        
for the latter (FASB, 2009b, pars. 29–30). 
4 SEC (2008) examined the cause of failure of 50 failed banks during 2008. The result 
showed that even though the failed banks reported larger amounts of fair value losses, 
the failure was due to loan losses rather than fair value losses. 
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between fair value losses and sales of securities, Bhat et al. (2010) investigated whether 
fair value accounting causes procyclicality by focusing on the relationship between sales 
of securities and changes in the prices of securities. The analyses found a relationship 
between decreases in liquidity of nonagency MBSs and sales of nonagency MBSs. In 
particular, the results showed that the relationship was more significant for banks with 
greater nonagency MBSs holdings, greater nonperforming loans, and lower capital ratios. 
Furthermore, Bhat et al. (2010) found reduced procyclical behavior after a change in 
accounting rules for impairments; that is, the easing of the fair value accounting rule5. 
These findings suggest a relationship between fair value accounting and procyclicality. 
In summary, analytical research demonstrates that pure fair value accounting 
contributes to procyclicality in illiquid markets. However, current accounting standards 
adopt mixed attribute accounting. Focusing on the impairment of securitized 
instruments during economic recessions, previous empirical research investigated 
whether fair value accounting causes procyclicality and has found mixed evidence6. 
 
4. Accounting for Securitization and Procyclicality 
Even though the cause of financial crisis was present during economic booms that 
precede economic downturns, very few studies examined the relationship between fair 
                                            
5 In addition, Bhat et al. (2010) found higher abnormal stock returns on event dates 
related to the easing of fair value accounting rules for banks with greater nonagency 
MBSs holdings and greater nonperforming loans. Further, Bowen et al. (2010) 
investigate whether bank stock prices are affected by events related to relaxing (or 
retaining) fair value accounting or impairment rules during the financial crisis. They 
generally provided evidence that relaxing (retaining) fair value accounting or 
impairment rules produced positive (negative) abnormal returns on event dates. 
6 Khan (2009) investigated whether fair value accounting was associated with an 
increase in systemic risk in the network of banks. The analysis found that more 
fair-value oriented banks experienced negative returns when money-center banks 
performed poorly. Moreover, the result showed that fair value accounting was associated 
with an increase in systemic risk during periods of market illiquidity. Furthermore, 
Khan (2009) found that banks with lower capital ratios or relatively higher proportions of 
fair value assets and liabilities affected the increase in systemic risk associated with fair 
value accounting. 
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value accounting and procyclicality before the financial crisis. Considering the recent 
financial crisis that arose from the securitization of subprime loans, this section 
investigates whether accounting for securitization promotes procyclicality7. 
 
4.1 Accounting for Securitization 
Currently, banks do not hold loans until maturity; instead, they have adopted an 
originate-and-distribute model that transfers loans for securitization. Shipper and Yohn 
(2007) describe the reasons why banks conduct asset securitizations; they do so to 
diversify holding assets, obtain greater liquidity for future growth, and to reduce 
financing costs. 
There are two accounting treatments that firms use to account for securitization 
transactions. One approach is sale accounting, which treats asset transfers as financial 
asset sales. The other approach is secured borrowing accounting, which treats asset 
transfers as borrowings by pledging financial assets. Under sale accounting, transferors 
remove the financial assets from the balance sheet and report gains or losses, which are 
calculated as the difference between the sale proceeds and the book value of the financial 
assets sold in the income statement. On the other hand, under secured borrowing 
accounting, financial assets remain on the balance sheet and transferors recognize the 
proceeds as liabilities. 
Although securitization accounting is classified as sale accounting or secured 
borrowing accounting, neither accounting treatment could faithfully represent many 
securitization transactions. Because transferors (originators) face numerous risks for 
transferred assets in many securitization transactions, it is difficult to classify 
                                            
7 Asset securitization is a financing method that transfers financial assets (homogenous 
loans such as mortgages, automobile loans, and credit card loans) from transferors 
(originators) to special purpose entities (SPEs) and issues securities that back the cash 
flows from the financial assets. This securitization process clarifies that securitization 
transactions are related to the following two accounting treatments: accounting for 
transfers of financial assets and accounting for consolidation of SPEs. This study focuses 
on accounting for transfers of financial assets and uses the term “accounting for 
securitization.” 
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securitization transactions as either sale or secured borrowing. 
In many securitization transactions, transferors (originators) hold retained interests 
and recourse obligations for credit enhancement. For credit enhancement, it is possible to 
issue high credit-rated asset-backed securities and to prevent special purpose entities 
(SPEs) from becoming bankrupt. Holders who have retained interests have the right to 
receive cash flows only after all payments of principal and interest for senior interests 
have been made, and thus have to bear losses for not collecting cash flows at the 
beginning. Moreover, holders with recourse obligations must buy back transferred assets 
when certain events such as defaults occur. Thus, transferors (originators) retain 
numerous risks for transferred assets by holding retained interests and recourse 
obligations for credit enhancement. Characteristics of transferred assets determine the 
extent to which transferors (originators) retain risks for transferred assets (Chen et al., 
2008). 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 140, Accounting for Transfers 
and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities, distinguishes 
between sale accounting and secured borrowing accounting, whether or not control over 
transferred assets is surrendered8,9. That is, if control is surrendered, firms can account 
for securitization transactions using sale accounting and vice versa (SFAS140, pars. 
11–12). Under SFAS140, firms can use sale accounting for securitization transactions if 
control over transferred assets is surrendered, even though they retain large portions of 
the risks10. 
                                            
8 SFAS140 considers that control over transferred assets is surrendered if all of the 
following three conditions are met: (1) the transferred assets have been isolated from a 
transferor; (2) a transferee has the right to pledge or exchange the received assets; and 
(3) the transferor does not maintain effective control over the transferred assets 
(SFAS140, par. 9). 
9 In June 2010, the FASB issued SFAS166, Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets, 
and amended SFAS140. This section examines the relationship between accounting 
treatments before the crisis and procyclicality; thus, we use original rules. 
10  This is also true for International Accounting Standard (IAS) 39, Financial 
Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. However, the basic approach for treating 
transfers of financial assets (derecognition) is different in SFAS140 and IAS39. For more 
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In addition to economic motivations, banks conduct securitization transactions for 
the purpose of accounting motivations, such as decreasing the capital ratio (Minton et al., 
2004) and earnings management (Karaoglu, 2005; Dechow and Shakespeare, 2009; 
Dechow et al., 2010). Compared with secured borrowing accounting, sale accounting 
reduces reported debt and raises reported net income when a gain on sale is recognized. 
Certainly, sale accounting has accounting benefits. Therefore, almost all firms structure 
securitization transactions to meet the requirements of sale accounting and report gains 
on sale (Dechow, et al., 2010, p. 5; Barth and Landsman, 2010, p. 409). 
Suppose transferors apply sale accounting and hold retained interests and recourse 
obligations. If low-risk assets are transferred, transferors are not expected to report 
impairments of retained interests and provide recourse. In this case, the possibility that 
gains on sales can be offset by losses after securitization is relatively low. However, if 
risky assets such as subprime mortgages are transferred, transferors are expected to 
report impairments of retained interests and provide recourse. Thus, the possibility is 
relatively high that gains on sales can be offset by losses after securitization. 
Although gains on sales are calculated as the differences between the sale proceeds 
and the book value of transferred assets, fair value measurements of retained interests 
and recourse obligations have effects on the amounts of the gain on sale. It is possible for 
transferors to record larger gains on sale by overestimating the fair value measurement 
of retained interests and/or by underestimating the fair value measurement of recourse 
obligations. Because retained interests and recourse obligations that transferors hold are 
traded only occasionally, transferors must estimate fair value using internal valuation 
models. Accordingly, the accuracy of a transferor’s reported gain on sale depends on its 
ability to estimate the fair value of retained interests and recourse obligations (Ryan, 
2007, pp. 218–219). 
Transferors provide non-contractual (implicit) recourses as well as contractual 
                                                                                                                                        
details on these differences, see Adhikari and Betrancourt (2008) and Schipper and Yohn 
(2007). 
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(explicit) recourses. Transferors buy back transferred assets to absorb losses from 
transferred assets to protect their reputations11. Implicit recourses require cash outflows 
in certain events. But the amount and timing of the cash outflows are not specified. 
Therefore, it is not clear whether implicit recourses meet the current definitions of 
liability in conceptual frameworks or are treated as constructive obligations (Shipper and 
Yohn, 2007, p. 75). Because implicit recourses are not recognized as liabilities on the 
balance sheet, gains on sales would be offset by losses on recourse in the event that 
implicit recourses are provided. 
In summary, banks use two accounting treatments to account for securitization 
transactions: sale accounting and secured borrowing accounting. Sale accounting has 
accounting benefits compared with secured borrowing accounting. Even though 
transferors hold numerous risks for transferred assets through not only retained 
interests and recourse obligations but also from implicit recourse, they can adopt sale 
accounting. Because gains on sales are expected to be offset by losses after securitization, 
investigating whether gains on sales are treated as realized income is necessary in the 
case of transferring risky assets such as subprime mortgages12. 
 
4.2 Accounting for Securitization and Procyclicality 
Fair value measurement of retained interests and recourse obligations affect the 
magnitude of the gain on sale. As described above, in some cases gains on sales are offset 
by losses after securitization; thus, gains on sales carry with them large uncertainty. 
Therefore, sale accounting is expected to promote procyclicality during economic booms 
in the same way as fair value accounting. 
                                            
11 If retained interests cover most potential losses from transferred assets, it is not 
necessary for transferors to provide implicit recourse. For instance, Amiram et al. (2010) 
suggest that impairments of retained interests contain information on implicit recourses. 
12 Whether or not a gain on sale is treated as realized income is related to the nature of 
securitization transactions. Niu and Richardson (2006) show that credit rating analysts 
view many securitization transactions as secured borrowing. Landsman et al. (2008) find 
that the stock market treats securitized assets and liabilities held by SPEs as assets and 
liabilities of transferors. 
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Under sale accounting, transferors derecognize transferred assets and recognize all 
assets obtained and liabilities incurred in consideration as proceeds of sales, and 
recognize in earnings the difference between sale proceeds and the carry amounts of 
transferred assets as gains or losses on the sale (SFAS140, par. 11). The assets and 
liabilities, except for retained interests (e.g., cash, service assets and liabilities, and 
recourse obligations), are measured at fair value. Retained interests such as 
subordinated and residual interests are measured at relative fair value13. Because 
SFAS140 requires firms to classify retained interests as trading or available-for-sale 
securities (SFAS140, par. 14), the difference between relative fair value and the fair value 
of retained interests is measured immediately and recognized in earnings for trading 
securities or in other comprehensive income for available-for-sale securities under 









A transferor (an originator) who holds total asset ( ) and total liability ( ) 
transfers a financial asset (the book value:l ) to an SPE. The SPE issues two types of 
interests: senior interests (a ) and subordinated interests (
A D
r ). The transferor obtains 
cash ( ), service assets ( ), and subordinated interests (retained interests), and 
incurs recourse obligations (o ). Suppose that the fair value of senior interests and 
the amounts of cash that the transferor accepts are same. 
c s
We examine the relationship between securitization accounting (sale accounting) 
and procyclicality by using a parsimonious model. The leverage ratio before a 
securitization transaction is 
DA
A
− . When a transferor (an originator) adopts sale 




                                            
13 Relative fair value for retained interests is computed by multiplying the carrying 
amount of a transferred financial asset by the percentage of the fair value of the asset 
attributable to the retained interests. 
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When we assume that the gain on sale is recognized ( 0>−>−+ rlosc ), the amount of 












Therefore, when a gain on sale is recognized and this condition is met, sale 
accounting decreases the leverage ratio compared with that before the securitization 
transaction. During economic booms, debtors of underlying assets are expected not to 
default and transferors (originators) receive principal and interest. The fair value of 
retained interests would be relatively overestimated and/or the fair value of recourse 
obligations would be relatively underestimated. The possibility of meeting the above 
condition would be high. 
As described in section 2, we assume that banks manage the leverage ratio. If sale 
accounting decreases the leverage ratio, banks have incentives to increase assets and 
debt to maintain the target leverage ratio. Suppose that banks take an additional debt of 
E  to purchase E  worth of assets to maintain the same leverage ratio as before the 
securitization transactions. E  is written as: 
( ) ( )LoD
DA
AoDE −=−
−= δδ , 
where 
A
lrsc −++=δ  a is nd L  the leverage ratio before the securitization transactions. 
This implies that banks must increase their debt and assets if they have higher leverage 
ratios. 
Fair value measurement of retained interests and recourse obligations has effects on 





                                            
14 For the amount of the gain on sale ( I ), when we compute I
r∂











∂ , they are written as: 
( )














Therefore, if r  increases and other components are held constant,  will decrease. 
Also, if  decreases and other components are held constant,  will decrease. 
saL
O saL
In addition, measuring retained interests and recourse obligations at fair value is 
expected to create the potential for either an unintentional or an intentional bias. 
Because retained interests and recourse obligations that transferors hold are traded only 
occasionally, transferors must estimate fair value using internal valuation models. In 
securitization transactions where the underlying assets are subprime mortgages, the 
probability of default is relatively high for subprime MBSs. However, credit risks of the 
debtors are underestimated to reflect favorable economic conditions. By overestimating 
retained interests and/or underestimating recourse obligations, the probability of 
measuring smaller leverage ratios would be high. In this case, banks must increase 
assets and debt to manage the leverage ratio. 
In summary, when gains on sales are recognized and certain conditions are met, sale 
accounting reduces the leverage ratio compared with holding financial assets. In addition, 
when banks adopt sale accounting for securitization transactions during economic booms, 
the leverage ratio decreases as retained interests and recourse obligations are measured 
at fair value. In this manner, sale accounting decreases the leverage ratio, and then 
                                                                                                                                        ( )

















Thus, if r  increases and other components are held constant, I  will increase. Also, if 
 decreases and other components are held constant, I  will increase. o
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banks must increase their assets to maintain the target leverage ratio. Moreover, if 
banks conduct securitization transactions and adopt sale accounting, then the leverage 
ratio decreases and assets are increased to maintain the target leverage ratio. Both sale 
accounting and fair value accounting are expected to promote procyclicality through the 
accounting acceleration effect during economic booms. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
We consider whether fair value accounting promotes procyclicality and find the 
relationship between fair value accounting and procyclicality by focusing on 
securitization transactions during economic booms. There are two accounting treatments 
for securitization transactions: sale accounting and secured borrowing accounting. Sale 
accounting has accounting benefits compared with secured borrowing accounting; almost 
all banks structure securitization transactions to meet the requirements for sale 
accounting. Even though transferors hold numerous risks for transferred assets through 
retained interests and recourse obligations, as well as implicit recourses, they can adopt 
sale accounting. In the case of transferring risky assets such as subprime mortgages, it is 
expected that gains on sales are offset by the impairments of retained interests and 
losses of explicit or implicit recourses after securitization. 
When gains on sales are recognized and certain conditions are met, sale accounting 
decreases the leverage ratio compared with that before the securitization transaction. 
The leverage ratio is smaller as retained interests and recourse obligations are measured 
at fair value, and then banks increase assets to maintain the target leverage ratio. 
Moreover, if banks conduct securitization transactions and adopt sale accounting, the 
leverage ratio decreases; therefore, assets are increased to maintain the target leverage 
ratio. It is expected that both sale accounting and fair value accounting promote 
procyclicality during economic booms. 
An issue remains for future research. This study theoretically indicates the 
relationship between fair value accounting and procyclicality by focusing on 
20 
securitization transactions. It is necessary to investigate whether this relationship is 
observed in reality by empirical research.
21 
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